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In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture
and Federal Drug Felonies: An
Expansion of a Harsh English
Tradition into a Modern Dilemma
William J. Hughes* with Edward H. O'Connell, Jr.**t
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug trafficking is one of the most serious offenses in our crimi-
nal justice system. Accordingly, the capture and conviction of
participants in drug trafficking organizations is of great concern to
society. However, society's interest does not end with a success-
ful conviction. It continues on to the effectiveness of the sanc-
tion(s) imposed upon the criminal in terms of deterrence,
punishment, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The drug traffick-
ing laws produce unique problems at the post-conviction stage be-
cause the huge profits resulting from these enterprises tend to
dampen the prospects for general deterrence or rehabilitation.
The natural consequence of this phenomenon is a call by the gen-
eral public for sanctions which would specifically deter and/or in-
capacitate an offender from engaging in the illegal drug trade
again.
* A.B., Rutgers University, 1955; J.D., Rutgers Law School, 1958; admitted to
practice before the New Jersey Supreme Court, New Jersey Federal District
Courts and the United States Supreme Court; President of the law firm of Love-
land, Hughes & Garrett, Ocean City, New Jersey; First Assistant Prosecutor, Cape
May County, New Jersey; Representative, 2d Cong. Dist., D-New Jersey; first
elected to Congress in 1974; Chairman, House Subcommittee on Crime, since 1981.
** Counsel, House Subcommittee on Crime.
t This article's proposal, the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984, was
passed in the form of a compromise version on October 12, 1984. The final draft
included RICO coverage, but did not include substitute asset coverage. The bill
was adopted in the Continuing Budget Resolution of 1985, Title II of H.J. REs. 648.
Criminal forfeiture sanctions would seem to be the appropriate
remedy. However, although arguably effective in achieving spe-
cific deterrence or incapacitation goals, such sanctions also raise
constitutional and historical problems. As United States Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Politz observed in a recent dissenting
opinion:
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, historically our society has abhored for-
feitures ... [T] he framers of the Constitution demonstrated their repudi-
ation of the harsh English tradition of criminal forfeiture, and our very
first Congress forbade the forfeiture of an estate because of a criminal
conviction. Further, a forfeiture with an in personam application, as we
have before us, is to be most charily assessed. 1
Judge Politz's allusion to a constitutional prohibition is to arti-
cle III, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution which
states: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish-
ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corrup-
tion of Blood or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted."2 The founding fathers, therefore, limited criminal for-
feiture as punishment for treason to the life estate of the defend-
ant's assets. As a result, it has been argued that because
forfeiture of estate, the ultimate in personam forfeiture, is prohib-
ited for treason, it is also prohibited for lesser crimes. 3 The first
Congress, in fact, specifically so provided when it enacted a stat-
ute providing: "No conviction or judgment. . . shall work corrup-
tion of blood or any forfeiture of estate."4
This article will "charily" explore the legal and historical ramifi-
cations of in personam forfeiture, discuss how this relates to drug
trafficking and, with due respect, propose an expansion of this
concept in federal drug felonies.
II. NEED
The dramatic increase in drug trafficking5 and the tremendous
profits associated with it6 indicate that current drug laws do not
deter and crime does pay. Drug dealers, who accumulate huge
fortunes as a result of illegal drug activities, frequently perceive
the financial penalties for drug dealing only as a cost of doing
business. Specifically, the retail value of illicit drugs sold in 1979
1. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962 (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J.,
dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
3. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1980).
4. See Act of April 30, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)).
5. See generally THE NAT'L NARcoTics INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM'N,
NARcoTIcs INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (1983).
6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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was estimated to be between $55 and $73 billion,7 whereas under
current federal law the maximum fine for many serious drug of-
fenses is only $25,000.8 Furthermore, the drug traffickers are in
turn using these profits to subvert the system. The illegal reve-
nues, roughly $60 billion annually, adversely affect the United
States banking system and the nation's economy.9 For example,
these revenues are being utilized by criminal organizations to in-
vest in legitimate business and real estate. Estimates indicate
that over 700 lawful United States businesses have been infil-
trated by organized crime. In Florida alone estimated real estate
investments resulting from narcotics trafficking totalled $1 billion
in 1977 and 1978.10
Against this background, present federal forfeiture procedures
are tested and found wanting." The following chart outlines the
extent to which, in practical terms, the present forfeiture proce-
dures were effective in 1979.
7. ASSET FORErTE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICK-
ING, April 10, 1981, GGD-81-S1, p.1-2 [hereinafter cited as ASSET FORFErrURE RE-
PORT). See also Statement of Edward Dennis, Chief, Narcotics Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Reps., 97th Cong., Sept. 16, 1981, Serial No.
126 at 67.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1982) (manufacture or distribution of narcotic
drugs punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years and/or a
fine of $25,000). For individuals with one or more prior convictions under any fed-
eral drug law, the penalties increase to a maximum of 30 years imprisonment,
$50,000 fine, or both. Id.
9. ASSET FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 16.
NARCOTICS-RELATED SEIZURES COMPARED To ESTIMATED ILLICIT
NARCOTIC INCOME
12
NARCOTICS INCOME RETAINED BY ILLEGAL U.S.
DISTRIBUTORS
CIVIL SEIZURES
DEA
Vehicles
Aircraft
Boats
Currency
Total DEA Civil
CUSTOMS
Vehicles
Aircraft
Boats
Currency
Total Customs Civil
Total Civil Seizures
CRIMINAL FORFEITURES
DEA
1979
$ 54,275,000,000
$ 3,500,000
$ 800,000
$ 600,000
$ 5,500,000
$10,400,000
$ 5,300,000
$ 4,300,000
$12,800,000
$ 100,000
$32,900,000
Real Estate $ 300,000
Total Criminal Forfeitures $ 300,000
TOTAL CIVIL SEIZURES AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURES $33,200,000
SEIZURES AS A PERCENT OF INCOME 0.06%
Convincing testimony concerning the enormity of the drug traf-
ficking problem and the inadequacies of present prosecution tools
was presented in United States v. Meinster, 13 a well publicized
prosecution dubbed the "Black Tuna" case by the media. Eight
defendants were convicted of racketeering14 and three were con-
victed in a continuing criminal enterprise.' 5 The statutes that the
above-mentioned defendants were convicted under are the only
existing laws with "in personam" forfeiture provisions. The crimi-
nal organization in Meinster may have handled over one million
pounds of marijuana, with gross receipts calculated at a minimum
of $220 million over a year and a half.16 According to the prosecu-
tor, the investigation did not penetrate the organization's fiscal
operation (how the money flowed and where the profits are), but
12. Forfeiture of Profits on Narcotics Traffickers, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25
(1980) (statement of William J. Anderson, Director, General Government Division,
General Accounting Office).
13. 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). See also For-
feiture of Profits on Narcotics Traffickers, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-60 (1980)
(prepared statement of Dana Biehl, Attorney, Department of Justice).
14. 664 F.2d at 985. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) (racketeering statute).
15. 664 F.2d at 985. See also 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982) (continuing criminal enter-
prise statute).
16. Forfeiture of Profits on Narcotics Traffickers, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59
(1980) (prepared statement of Dana Biehl, Attorney, Department of Justice).
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the evidence showed that numerous bank deposits going as high
as one-half million dollars were made.17 Nevertheless, forfeiture
to the federal government in this case amounted to a mere $16,000
under the existing criminal forfeiture procedures.18 Presumably,
the remaining uncovered "profits" are financing other "Black
Tuna" drug operations.
There are numerous factors that adversely affect the pursuit of
forfeiture sanctions in cases like "Black Tuna." The lack of lead-
ership and management capacity in the federal government to
pursue the complex tracing of drug assets are examples. How-
ever, substantial deficiencies in the two existing in personam
criminal statutes themselves also account for many of the
problems outlined in the "Black Tuna" and other forfeiture cases.
III. IN PERSONAM AND IN REM FORFErITURES
It is important to first differentiate between the types of forfei-
ture. In personam, or criminal, forfeiture is based on a determina-
tion of a defendant's personal guilt, and, as a result, the
government has a right to certain property possessed by the of-
fender.19 On the other hand, in rem, or civil, forfeiture is based on
the common law fiction that the subject of the forfeiture itself is
guilty of wrongdoing; therefore, the property may be held as for-
feited.20 In the words of a medieval English writer, "[w]here a
man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword
shall be forfeit[ed] as deodand, and yet no default is in the
owner."2 1 Under this theory, the legal action is against the prop-
erty which is considered tainted by the acts which gave rise to
civil forfeiture.22 This in rem taint theory is described as taking
effect immediately upon the commission of an illegal act.23 The
right to the property vests in the government at that moment, and
17. Id. at 58-60.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Criminal forfeiture has been defined as a "post-conviction divestiture of
the defendant's property or financial interest that has an association with his crim-
inal activities." Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension
of Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 227, 229, 232 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Forfeiture ].
20. United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971).
21. Id. at 719-20 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 23 (M. Howe ed.
1963)).
22. See Forfeiture, supra note 19, at 232-33.
23. Id. at 234.
when forfeiture is sought, the condemnation relates back to that
time and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even as to
purchasers in good faith.24
The distinction between "in personam" and "in rem" forfeiture
was made early in our history by Justice Story in The Palmyra.25
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the
party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not,
strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a conse-
quence, of the judgement of conviction .... In the contemplation of the
common law, the offender's right was not divested until the conviction.
But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by
statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The
thing [in in rem] is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather
the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the of-
fense be malum prohibitum; or malum in se. 2 6
The in rem forfeiture statutes in use today are an outgrowth of
similar statutes applied by common law courts in the American
colonies prior to the adoption of the Constitution.27 These forfei-
ture provisions were incorporated in customs, revenue, and navi-
gation laws.28 Soon after the Constitution was adopted, a number
of offenses, including, for example, those pertaining to the slave
trade, were made subject to in rem forfeiture under federal law. 29
Enactment of forfeiture statutes under state and federal law has
continued and now encompasses virtually any type of property
that might be used in the conduct of criminal activity. 30
24. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1880). The vitality of Stowell
was recognized by the Supreme Court as recently as Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685 (1974).
25. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
26. Id. at 14.
27. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-45 (1943).
28. Id. at 145-48.
29. Act of July 31, 1789, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47. See
also Act of August 4, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 35, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 157,
161, 163, 176; Act of March 22, 1794, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 347; Act of
March 2, 1807, 7th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 22, § 2, 2 Stat. 426.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1982) (forfeiture of property acquired in violation of
anti-trust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (1982) (forfeiture of property used in connection
with illegal gambling); 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 117(d), 128, 171, 256c, 4081 (1982) (forfeiture
of guns and other equipment used unlawfully in national parks); 18 U.S.C. § 924
(1982) (forfeiture of firearms used illegally); 18 U.S.C. § 1082 (1982) (forfeiture of
property used in connection with illegal gambling); 18 U.S.C. § 3617(d) (1982) (for-
feiture of vehicles and aircraft seized for a violation of liquor laws); 18 U.S.C.§§ 3618-3619 (1982) (forfeiture of conveyances used to introduce intoxicants into
Indian territories); 19 U.S.C. § 1306 (1982) (forfeiture of unwholesome imported
meat); 19 U.S.C. § 1453 (1982) (forfeiture of property seized in violation of customs
laws); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1982) (forfeiture of adulterated food); 31 U.S.C. § 490 (forfei-
ture of funds illegally withheld by public official); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982) (forfeiture
of vessels, vehicles and aircraft used to transport contraband).
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IV. HISTORY OF IN PERSONAM FORFEITURES
As distinguished from the commonly used and accepted in rem
forfeiture process, the general antipathy in our law for in per-
sonam forfeiture relates primarily to forfeiture of estate, which
was the ultimate penalty of this kind at common law. Circuit
Judge Winter, in United States v. Grande,31 noted that under
early English law the complete forfeiture of all real and personal
property followed as a consequence of conviction for a felony or
treason. This was consistent with the basic premise of feudal so-
ciety that the King, who was ultimately the owner of all land and
property, would regain all land and property if there was a breach
of faith, such as a conviction for murder.32 As Judge Winter
noted, "when convicted of treason or a felony, the defendants'
'blood was corrupted' so that nothing could pass by inheritance
through his line."33 As the feudal system evolved, the application
of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood offenses narrowed.34
Although forfeiture of estate was applied in the American colo-
nies occasionally, 35 the use of forfeiture of estate and corruption
of blood for treason was banned by the Constitution in 1787.36
Furthermore, in personam forfeiture is prohibited for all federal
convictions and judgments,3 7 and many state constitutions have
forbidden forfeiture of estate. 38
Prior to 1970, the only federal law with in personam forfeiture
was the Confiscation Act of 186239 which authorized the President
31. 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1980).
32. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox. Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 183 (1973).
33. 620 F.2d at 1038.
34. See Forfeiture, supra note 19, at 232.
35. Id. at 233.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982).
38. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 19; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 16;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9; CONN. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (treason
conviction may not result in any forfeiture of estate); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 15; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 23; GA. CONST. § 2-203; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 30;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 12; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 27; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 11; MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 30; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 29 (for forfeiture of estate as con-
sequence of conviction or attainder for treason); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 12; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 15; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 25; PA. CONST. art. I, § 19; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 21; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 15; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 18; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12.
39. Confiscation Act, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
to seize the life estate of Confederate soldiers. This statute was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Forest 4O and Miller v.
United States. 41
In 1970, however, an in personam forfeiture procedure was in-
cluded both in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions statute (hereinafter RICO),42 and the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise Statute (hereafter CCE).43 Under RICO, if convicted
of racketeering, the defendant forfeits all "interest" in the crimi-
nal "enterprise."" CCE provides that any defendant convicted
under that statute specifically forfeits "profits" derived from the
criminal enterprise. 45
The justification for these extraordinary sanctions in RICO, also
applicable to CCE, was stated in United States v. Martino. 46 The
legislative history is "replete" with references to a broad "hit
them where they hurt" philosophy.47 The legislative intent to ap-
ply forfeiture of assets as both a penalty and a deterrent is clear.
For example, Senator Robert Byrd, a member of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, anticipated the deterrent effect of the broad for-
feiture sanctions when he stated, "[b]y removing its leaders from
positions of ownership, by preventing them and their associates
from regaining control, and by visiting heavy economic sanctions
on their predatory business practices this legislation should prove
to be a might[y] deterrent to any further expansion of organized
crime's economic power."4
40. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869).
41. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
The penalty section of RICO provides in part:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has ac-
quired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind af-
fording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has estab-
lished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of,
in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
43. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1266 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982)). The
penalty section of CCE provides in part:
Any person who is convicted under paragraph 1 of engaging in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States-
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise; and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual
rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, such enterprise.
21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2) (1982).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982).
46. 681 F.2d 952, 957 (1982).
47. Id. at 957 n.17.
48. 116 CONG. REC. S607 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (em-
phasis in original).
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When enacted by Congress, these provisions were perceived to
be a bold and innovative approach to attack the economic base of
criminal activity, including narcotics trafficking. 49 In fact, how-
ever, the success of in personam forfeitures under RICO and CCE
has been minimal. First, the percentage of illicit narcotic income
forfeited is negligible. 50 Second, from the enactment of these stat-
utes in 1970 until March 30, 1980, only ninety-eight prosecutions
were brought for drug violations under either of these statutes.5 1
There are a number of reasons, many administrative in nature,
why the forfeiture provisions in RICO and CCE have not been as
effective as anticipated in attacking the economic base of drug
trafficking.52 Non-administrative problems which continue to
limit forfeiture procedures and their effectiveness include: first,
statutory limitations on the scope of property to be forfeited; sec-
ond, the degree of "nexus" which must be shown between the il-
legal activity and the property to be forfeited; and third, the lack
of existing statutory tools to prevent concealment or transfer of
property involved in a criminal transaction to a third person
before forfeiture can be accomplished. 53 Some progress, however,
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL FORFEITURE UNDER THE RICO AND
CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE STATUTES (1980).
50. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
51. ASSET FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. Total Narcotic Cases
Charged Under RICO and CCE
(For the period 1970 through March 1980)
(note a)
CCE and
RICO RICO
CCE (Narcotics) Narcotics TOTAL
Number of cases 73 16 9 98
Amount of forfeitures
(thousands)a $659 $1,305 (b) $1,964
a. The litigation status of forfeiture cases indicated as of March 1980 are
updated through September 1980.
b. Forfeitures in this case totalled $187,000 and are included in the RICO
and CCE totals as follows: $65,000-CCE, $122,000-RICO.
52. Id. at 16-29.
53. Id. at 30-42. In the past, prosecutors faced another major problem with the
RICO statute. It was whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encom-
passed both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or was limited to the former.
Thus, one circuit maintained some doubt as to whether a de facto criminal enter-
prise could be subject to a RICO prosecution. In United States v. Turkette, 632
F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that such wholly
criminal de facto enterprises were not subject to a RICO prosecution. The deci-
sion was contrary to numerous other circuits' positions. See, e.g., United States v.
Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985,
992-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618
has been made in correcting administrative problems in recent
years.54
A. Scope of Property to be Forfeited
RICO provides that upon conviction for racketeering in an en-
terprise, the defendant should forfeit to the United States any "in-
terest he has acquired or maintained in violation of [RICO]."s
Circuit courts generally have construed this language to mean
that only interests of enterprises which violated RICO were sub-
ject to forfeiture while profits and income derived from violations
of RICO were not.56 Such an interpretation greatly hindered the
effectiveness of the provision in combating illegal drug traffick-
ing.5 7 However, the United States Supreme Court, in Russello v.
United States,58 recently corrected this misinterpretation by hold-
ing that "interest" included profits and proceeds received from ac-
tivities prohibited by RICO.
On the other hand, CCE specifically provides that profits ob-
tained from activities prohibited by CCE are subject to forfei-
ture.59  One possible weakness of this provision is an
interpretation that profits equal proceeds minus costs. Such an
interpretation would again greatly hamper the effectiveness of
forfeiture in preventing drug trafficking and would give a prosecu-
tor an impossible burden of proof.60 A more realistic limitation on
the scope of property subject to forfeiture under CCE is the stat-
ute itself. The forfeiture only becomes effective if the defendant
carries on a series of narcotic offenses, 61 supervises, directs, or
manages at least five or more persons in the course of carrying
out this series of offenses,62 and receives substantial resources by
F.2d 523, 525 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-05 (7th
Cir. 1979). This issue could be particularly relevant to drug trafficking enterprises
which almost by definition are de facto criminal enterprises. The Supreme Court
in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), reversed the circuit court; there-
fore this problem has been alleviated. However, the question of what constitutes
the appropriate assets of such an organization remains unanswered.
54. ASSET FORFErrURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-19.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1982).
56. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Marubeni Amer. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 301 (1983).
58. Id.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2) (A) (1982).
60. In United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1976), affd in part,
432 U.S. 137 (1977), the court noted the "extreme difficulty in ... finding hard evi-
dence of [conspiratorial or criminal] net profits."
61. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (2) (1982). A series of narcotic offenses requires proof of
three or more related violations. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (2) (A) (1982).
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virtue of operating the continuing criminal enterprise.63
B. Degree of Nexus Which Must be Shown Between Illegal
Activity and Property to be Forfeited
In personam forfeiture requires that there be a nexus between
the illegal act and the property forfeited.64 In general, there are
four classes of property subject to forfeiture under both RICO
and CCE: (1) contraband, goods or merchandise whose importa-
tion, exportation or possession is forbidden (these are the most
commonly forfeited goods, examples being controlled substances
and gambling devices); (2) derivative contraband, items which
serve the purpose of conveying or facilitating the illegal transac-
tion, such as cars, boats, and airplanes; (3) direct proceeds, such
as cash received in the illegal transaction; and (4) derivative pro-
ceeds, property that may be unrelated to the illegal operation but
which is purchased and maintained directly or indirectly with the
proceeds of the illegal transactions, such as stocks or real estate
investments. 65
It is this fourth category, derivative proceeds, which has
presented the most difficulty in forfeitures in drug cases. Actu-
ally, the problem is both statutory and enforcement in nature.
One of the administrative deficiencies is the lack of technical ex-
pertise in the Drug Enforcement Agency in dealing with financial
cases. 66 Proof of a nexus between derivative proceeds and the il-
legal activity usually requires extensive tracing to determine if
the property is forfeitable under criminal forfeiture, however, and
some of these problems can be handled statutorily.67
C. Concealment or Transfer of Assets to Third Parties
Inability to preserve assets which might be subject to forfeiture
is the third and probably most important flaw existing in in per-
sonam forfeiture procedures at the present time. The difficulty
comes from the liquidity of the assets involved, particularly in
drug related crimes where the defendants have developed sophis-
63. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B) (1982).
64. See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
65. See ASSET FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-4.
66. ASSET FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19-21.
67. For a discussion of tracing, see TRAJANOWSKI, RICO FORFEITURE: TRACING
AND PROCEDURE IN TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGAN-
IZED CRIMES 378 (G. Blackey ed. 1980).
ticated methods of concealing the assets, laundering the profits,
and then investing in clean assets.
Preserving derivative assets which might be subject to forfei-
ture is particularly difficult under RICO and CCE. These difficul-
ties were expressed in a Senate Report which stated:
Unlike civil forfeitures, in which the government's seizure of the asset oc-
curs at or soon after the commencement of the forfeiture action, in crimi-
nal forfeitures, the assets generally remain in the custody of the
defendant until the time of his conviction for the offense upon which the
forfeiture is based. Only after conviction does the government seize the
asset. Thus, a person who anticipates that some of his property may be
subject to criminal forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive, but also
ample opportunity, to transfer his assets or remove them from the juris-
diction of the court prior to trial and so shield them from any possibility of
forfeiture.
Currently the only mechanism available to the government to prevent
such actions is the authority to obtain a restraining order, and this statu-
tory authority is limited to the post-indictment period. Thus, even if the
government is aware that a person is disposing of his property in anticipa-
tion of a filing of criminal changes [sic] against him, it has no specific au-
thority under the RICO or CCE statutes to obtain an appropriate
protective order. Furthermore, even if the government is able to obtain a
restraining order, should the defendant choose to defy it, he can effec-
tively prevent the forfeiture of his property and face only the possibility of
contempt sanctions for his defiance of the court's order. The important
economic impact of imposing the sanction of forfeiture against the defend-
ant is thus lost. 68
V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG PENALTY ACT OF 1984-
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Based on these demonstrated weaknesses in current forfeiture
laws and a desire to attack the economic base of drug trafficking,
Congress is considering the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of
1984 [CDPA].69 CDPA was designed to increase the effectiveness
of the criminal forfeiture provisions under federal procedures by
addressing the three areas of weakness previously outlined.7 0
68. S. REP. No. 97-520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
69. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The same piece of legislation was
enacted previously in 1982 by the 97th Congress (H.R. 7140 and S. 2572). A modi-
fied version of H.R. 7140 was included as Title I of an anti-crime package, H.R. 3963,
which passed both Houses of Congress. The bill, however, was pocket vetoed by
President Reagan on January 14, 1983. Memorandum of Disapproval, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 47 (Jan. 14, 1983). President Reagan's failure to sign H.R. 3963
was unrelated to the Title I provisions concerning forfeiture. In fact, the President
stated that "[w]hile its provisions on forfeiture of criminal assets and profits fall
short of what the Administration proposed, they are clearly desirable. Had they
been presented to me as a separate measure, I would have been pleased to give
my approval." Id.
70. See supra notes 53, 55-68 and accompanying text. CDPA, in fact, goes con-
siderably beyond the problem of criminal forfeiture.
First, CDPA substantially increases maximum permissible criminal fines in drug
cases (generally tenfold) and establishes a new alternative fine concept under
which drug offenders can be fined up to twice their gross profits or proceeds where
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A. Scope of Property to be Forfeited
Regarding the scope of property which can be forfeited under
the new statute, CDPA states:
Any person who is convicted of a felony under this title of title III (the
Controlled Substances Act) [711 shall forfeit to the United States such per-
son's interest in-
(1) any property constituting or derived from gross profits or other pro-
ceeds obtained as a result of such violation;
(2) any property used, or intended to be used, to commit such violation;
and
(3) in the case of a person convicted under section 408 of this title
[CCEI,[72] in addition to the property described in paragraphs (1) and
(2), any interest in, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal
the alternative fine would be greater than that specified in the crime itself. H.R.
4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984).
Second, it amends the present civil forfeiture law, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), to per-
mit the civil forfeiture of land and buildings used, or intended to be used, for hold-
ing or storage of controlled substances when such use constitutes a felony. H.R.
4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1984). Current law is unclear as to whether ware-
houses or other buildings can be forfeited.
Third, CDPA changes certain venue authority to allow the Justice Department
to bring civil forfeiture actions in the district where the defendant is found or
where the criminal prosecution is brought. Id.
Fourth, it sets aside up to $10 million per year in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 from
forfeiture dispositions into Department of Justice and Customs revolving funds to
be used for drug law enforcement purposes. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 108,
209 (1984).
Fifth, it outlines authority for courts to restrain the transfer of property which
might be subject to forfeiture and allows, under certain circumstances, the seizure
of such property in order to insure its availability for a forfeiture proceeding. Re-
mission and mitigation provisions are also provided in order to protect the interest
of innocent property owners. It also details procedures for allowing temporary re-
straining orders in ex parte hearings under extraordinary circumstances. Id. at
§ 104.
CDPA also contains significant administrative reforms in Title II dealing with
the Customs Service. Id. at §§ 201-214. This is intended to expeditiously alleviate
some of the egregious administrative aspects of forfeiture procedures. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETrER CARE AND DISPOSAL OF SEIZED CARS, BOATS
AND PLANES SHOULD SAVE MONEY AND BENEFIT LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983). The es-
sence of Title II is to: first, increase the scope of what the Customs Service could
"administratively forfeit" (essentially a default judgment process in their civil for-
feiture procedure) from $10,000 to $100,000, with no dollar limit in cases involving a
conveyance of contraband in default situations; second, set up a "Customs Forfei-
ture Fund;" third, allow the Customs Service to discontinue forfeiture on property
in favor of similar proceedings by state and local agencies; and fourth, increase
certain Customs' law enforcement authority. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201-
214.
71. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1982).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982). See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text.
enterprise. 73
Thus, criminal forfeiture is expanded to all "gross profits or other
proceeds" for all federal drug felonies. Therefore, CDPA makes
clear that the scope of the property is broad as distinguished from
the present "profits" in CCE.74 Furthermore, CDPA expands
criminal forfeiture to approximately twenty-five percent of the
federal criminal caseload.7 5
B. Degree of Nexus Which Must be Shown
CDPA sets forth procedures for a "permissive" presumption
that property obtained by drug traffickers during the time period
of their illegal acts is subject to forfeiture. 76 This section draws
upon the practice in criminal tax evasion cases of using the de-
fendants' net worth to establish the government's case 77 and cre-
73. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984).
74. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
75. The felony offenses under Titles I and III of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act are violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982) (except
first offenses involving Schedule V substances and distribution of small amounts
of marijuana for no remuneration); 21 U.S.C. § 842 (1982) (repeat violations of cer-
tain more serious regulatory offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 843 (1982) (knowing and inten-
tional violations concerning fraud and offenses involving counterfeit substance,
and the use of communications facilities in committing felonies under the Act); 21
U.S.C. § 844(a) (1982) (possession); 21 U.S.C. § 845 (1982) (special penalties for dis-
tribution to persons under 21); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (attempt and conspiracy
where the underlying offense was a felony); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982) (continuing
criminal enterprise); 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982) (importation of controlled substances);
21 U.S.C. § 954 (1982) (knowing or intentional transshipment and in-transit ship-
ment of controlled substances without the approval of the Attorney General); 21
U.S.C. § 955a (1982) (manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to manu-
facture or distribute, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute con-
trolled substances on board vessels); 21 U.S.C. § 955c (1982) (offenses and
punishment for attempt or conspiracy to commit a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955a
(1982)); 21 U.S.C. § 957 (1982) (export and import by certain non-registrants); 21
U.S.C. § 959 (1982) (manufacture or distribution for purposes of unlawful importa-
tion); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982) (attempt or conspiracy to commit felony importation
offenses of Title II of the Act).
76. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984). CDPA states:
There may be a rebuttable presumption at trial that any property of a
person convicted of a felony under this title or title III is subject to forfei-
ture under this section if the United States establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that-
(1) such property was acquired by such person during the offense or
within a reasonable time after the offense; and
(2) there was no likely source for such property other than the violation
of this title or title III.
Id.
77. For a discussion of the net worth method of proof in tax cases, see Holland
v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125-29 (1954).
In a typical net worth prosecution, the Government, having concluded
that the taxpayer's records are inadequate as a basis for determining in-
come tax liability, attempts to establish an "opening net worth" or total
net value of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning of a given year. It then
proves increases in the taxpayer's net worth for each succeeding year dur-
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ates a presumption of forfeitability once the government has
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that two circum-
stances exist: (1) the defendant acquired the property during the
violation period or within a reasonable time thereafter; and (2)
there is no likely source for acquisition of the property other than
the criminal activity.7 8 The consequences of this presumption are
straightforward. Once the government has met its burden of
proof with respect to the two circumstances, the trier of fact is
permitted to find that property is subject to forfeiture. As such,
CDPA follows the procedures for a permissive (rebuttable) pre-
sumption outlined in Tot v. United States,7 9 Leary v. United
States, 80 and Ulster County Court v. Allen 8' and should alleviate
some of the problems in showing a direct nexus between the ille-
gal activity and the derivative proceeds.8 2
C. Concealment or Transfer of Assets to Third Parties
CDPA outlines the general authority of courts to restrain the
transfer of property which might be subject to forfeiture in order
to ensure its availability for a forfeiture proceeding. 83 This is iden-
ing the period under examination and calculates the difference between
the adjusted net values of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning and end
of each of the years involved. The taxpayer's nondeductible expenditures,
including living expenses, are added to these increases, and if the result-
ing figure for any year is substantially greater than the taxable income re-
ported by the taxpayer for that year, the Government claims the excess
represents unreported taxable income. In addition, it asks the jury to in-
fer willfulness from this understatement, when taken in connection with
direct evidence of "conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal."
Id. at 125 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1942)).
78. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984).
79. 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (statutory presumption cannot be upheld if there is
no rational connection between fact proved and ultimate fact presumed).
80. 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (criminal statutory presumption must be "more likely
than not" to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend).
81. 442 U.S. 140, 165-66 (1978) (application of statutory presumption requires a
"'rational connection' between the basic facts the prosecution proved").
82. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
83. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984) states:
In any action brought by the United States under this section, the dis-
trict courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such re-
straining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including,
but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in
connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under
this section, as it shall deem proper.
Id.
tical to the present RIC084 language and similar to CCE85
procedures.
The courts have interpreted this language to authorize re-
straining orders prior to conviction, even an initial ex parte re-
straining order.86 An issue has arisen, however, as to the
standard by which these restraining orders will be judged. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[iln the absence of
specific language to the contrary, the district court must apply the
standards of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which requires [sic] an immediate hearing whenever a temporary
restraining order has been granted ex parte. ' 8 7 The government
has vigorously contested the court's contention that a full eviden-
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1982).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (1982) states:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to
enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other ac-
tions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in con-
nection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this
section, as they shall deem proper.
86. See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (upheld ex
parte restraining order in RICO prosecution providing defendant was entitled to
prompt hearing once restraining order entered); United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d
1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984) (ordered
dissolution of ex parte restraining order where CCE defendants had not been
given hearing after entry of order).
87. Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1297. Rule 65 states in part:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral
notice to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that im-
mediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and
(2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if
any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting
his claim that notice should not be granted. Every temporary restraining
order granted without notice. . . shall define the injury and state why it is
irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall ex-
pire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as
the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause
shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the
order is directed consents that it may be extended for a like period or un-
less the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be
extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be en-
tered of record. In case a temporary restraining order is granted without
notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hear-
ing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters ex-
cept older matters of the same character; and when the motion comes on
for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall
proceed with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does
not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2
days' notice to the party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party
may appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the
court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as
the ends of justice require.
FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b).
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tiary hearing is needed for such a restraining order 88 and main-
tains that such a requirement would require a premature
disclosure of certain witnesses,89 as well as preclude hearsay evi-
dence.90 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, also stated
in United States v. Spilotro:
It is not necessary that the hearing duplicate the pending criminal trial;
the prosecution need only demonstrate the probability that the jury will
convict the defendant and find the properties subject to forfeiture. The
prosecution must, however, produce sufficient evidence to permit the Dis-
trict Court to independently assess whether the burden has been met; it
may not rely simply upon the indictment and its own assessment of the
strength of its case.9 1
Another issue regarding restraining orders is their effect on a
defendant's right to counsel. In United States v. Meinster,92 the
court approved a post-indictment transfer of defendants' assets to
their retained counsel in satisfaction of unpaid attorney's fees,
thereby depleting by a substantial amount the potentially forfeita-
ble assets.93 In United States v. Bello,94 however, the court re-
fused to dissolve a restraining order over the defendant's
argument that the assets were needed to exercise his sixth
amendment right to counsel. The district court held that such re-
fusal did not deprive the defendant of counsel but only of an at-
torney of his choice, because he was entitled to court appointed
counsel.9 5
CDPA also establishes a procedure for restraining property
even before indictment or information and details procedures for
allowing ex parte hearings under extraordinary circumstances. 96
The ex parte pre-indictment or information procedures would fol-
low severe restrictions similar to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules
88. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at 11, United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984).
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id. at 15.
91. 680 F.2d at 618 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
92. 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
93. Forfeiture of Profits on Narcotics Traffickers: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1980) (prepared statement of Dana Biehl, Attorney, Department of
Justice).
94. 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
95. Id.
96. H.R. 4901, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1984) states:
(1) In addition to any order authorized by subsection (i) [see supra
note 83], the court may, before the filing of an indictment or information,
of Civil Procedure 97 and would normally be limited to ten days.98
This process is designed to protect the forfeiture sanction in situ-
ations where the property to be forfeited may be easily moved,
concealed, or disposed of in the relatively short period of time be-
tween the giving of notice and the holding of an adversary hearing
concerning the entry of a restraining order.
The permissibility of the postponement of notice and hearing
until after the initial entry of a restraining order in a criminal for-
feiture case has not been squarely considered by the courts.
However, a similar issue was addressed with respect to the more
intrusive action of seizure in the context of civil forfeiture. In
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 99 a yacht car-
rying marijuana was seized pursuant to a Puerto Rican civil for-
feiture statute, without prior notice or adversary hearing. The
Supreme Court held that immediate seizure of a property inter-
est, without an opportunity for a prior hearing, was permitted in
certain circumstances where: first, ex parte seizure served a sig-
nificant governmental purpose, i.e., preventing continued criminal
use of the property and enforcing criminal sanctions; and second,
the property could easily be removed, concealed, or destroyed if
advance warning of the seizure was given. 00 The Court went on
to state that, unlike the situation in Fuentes v. Shevin, 101 a case
relied on by the lower courts in holding that the seizure was un-
constitutional, the seizure was not initiated by self-interested pri-
enter an order restraining the transfer of property that is or may be sub-
ject to forfeiture.
(2) An order shall be entered under this subsection if the court deter-
mines that-
(A) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail
on the issue of forfeiture;
(B) there is substantial probability that failure to enter the order will
result in unavailability of the property for forfeiture; and
(C) the need to assure availability of the property outweighs the hard-
ship on any person against whom the order is to be entered.
(3) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an order under this
subsection shall be entered only after notice to persons appearing to have
an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing.
(B) A temporary order under this subsection may be entered upon ap-
plication of the United States, without notice or opportunity for a hearing,
if an information or indictment has not been filed and the United States
demonstrates that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the
property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more
than 10 days after the date on which it is entered, except that the court
may extend the effective period of the order for not more than 10 days for
good cause shown and for a longer period with the consent of each person
affected by the order.
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
100. Id. at 678-80.
101. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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vate parties, but rather by government officials. 0 2 Because these
considerations are also present where the government seeks sim-
ply to restrain the transfer or disposition of property that may be
subject to criminal forfeiture, the postponement of notice and
hearing in CDPA is also likely permissive.
D. What CDPA Does Not Do
This article has defined certain problems which law enforce-
ment officials have encountered in the effective use of "in per-
sonam" forfeitures and some solutions to these problems in drug
felonies as proposed in CDPA. However, there are a few things
that CDPA does not do.
1. CDPA Does Not Amend RICO
CDPA does not amend RICO1o3 for two reasons. First, CDPA is
aimed at where the need for change is greatest. 0 4 Second, RICO
is an extremely broad statute that includes criminal activity far
afield from the more insidious drug trade105 and has been increas-
ingly attacked by scholars 0 6 and, most recently, by the American
Bar Association's Section on Criminal Justice in their 1982 Con-
vention. 0 7 Under such circumstances, it was deemed advisable to
102. 416 U.S. at 679.
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
104. See supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
105. Included in the definition of racketeering activities encompassed by RICO
are "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion .. " 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (A) (1982).
106. See Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65
IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980); Tarlow, Due Process Pays the Price for Forfeitures High
Cost, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 1981, at 26; Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prose-
cutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379 (1980); Weiner,
Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
225 (1981); Comment, Aiding and Abetting the Investment of Dirty Money: Mens
Rea and the Nonracketeer Under RICO Section 1962(a), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 574
(1982).
107. ABA SECTION OF CRIM. JUST., 1982 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(1982). The ABA Section of Criminal Justice made the following recommenda-
tions as to RICO at their 1982 meeting in San Francisco:
1. Replace the term "racketeering activity" by less pejorative phrase "criminal
activity."
2. Provide that a criminal activity may be charged only if it occurs within five
years of the date of the indictment.
3. Provide that the criminal activities must occur in different criminal episodes
which are separate in time and place yet sufficiently related by purpose to
demonstrate a continuity of activity.
limit the expansion of in personam forfeitures and a number of
CDPA's extraordinary procedures to drug felonies only, pending a
full review of the ramifications of these other questions about the
RICO statute.108
2. CDPA Does Not Include a Substitute Asset Provision
The Senate and Administration proposals also included a sec-
tion regarding substitute assets under both RICO and CCE which
is not included in CDPA.109 This provision would permit the for-
feiture of assets with no known nexus to the violations involved if
other property subject to forfeiture has been removed, concealed,
transferred, or substantially depleted.110 Because CDPA broadens
the scope of forfeiture to proceeds (or gross profits) from profits
in all drug felonies, substantially increases fines (up to twice the
gross profits), and includes a permissible presumption that prop-
erty acquired during the violation is forfeitable, a further inclu-
4. Provide that the criminal activities must be related by a common scheme or
plan.
5. Require that a pattern of criminal activity include at least one offense other
than a violation of § 1341 [wire fraud], § 2314 [interstate transportation of stolen
goods], and § 2315 [sale or receipt of stolen goods].
6. Apply § 1962(a) only to those who are involved as principals in a pattern of
criminal activity or collection of an unlawful debt.
7. Provide that § 1962(b) and (c) include a mens rea element requiring that the
accused knowingly commit the proscribed activities.
8. Repeal § 1962(d) (conspiracy count).
9. Repeal the liberal construction clause, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947.
10. Provide that § 1963(a), relative to forfeiture, reads "may have forfeited"
rather than "shall forfeit."
11. Require that parties not charged with RICO offenses be granted a jury hear-
ing, to be held immediately after the verdict in the initial prosecution and prior
to any final judgment of forfeiture, regarding their claim to ownership in any
property sought to be forfeited.
12. Add this language to § 1963(b): "A hearing shall be held in accordance with
rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Id.
108. The delay seems somewhat justified, because, at least, the proceeds ques-
tion has been decided in favor of the government. See supra notes 72-75 and ac-
companying text.
109. S. 948, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
110. Id. For instance, Title III of S. 948 would set up a new § 1963(d) of Title 18.
(d) If any of the property described in subsection (a)-
(1) cannot be located,(2) has been transferred to, sold to, or deposited with a third party,
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,(4) has been substantially diminished in value by any act or omission of
the defendant, or(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
without difficulty, the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property
of the defendant up to the value of any property described in paragraphs
(1) through (5).
Id. at § 101.
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sion of substitute assets would have come dangerously close to
the constitutional problems under the eighth amendment and
prohibition of forfeiture of estate discussed earlier."'
Although the courts generally have held that the in personam
forfeiture provisions of both RICO and CCE are constitutional as
previously applied,112 there have been numerous indications that
"[s]uch a penal foray bespeaks a need for circumspection."" 3 For
instance, the court in United States v. Marubeni America Corpora-
tion 114 noted:
The forfeiture provision [RICO] could, indeed, be read to produce penal-
ties shockingly disproportionate to the offense. For example, a shop-
keeper who over many years and with much honest labor establishes a
valuable business could forfeit it all if, in the course of his business, he is
mixed up in a single fraudulent scheme. This example raises issues of
statutory construction and constitutional law which we leave for another
day.1
15
Similarly, the court in United States v. Huber116 warned:
We do not say that no forfeiture sanction may ever be so harsh as to vio-
late the Eighth Amendment. But at least where the provision for forfei-
ture is keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it is
in RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional to the
crime. We further note that where the forfeiture threatens disproportion-
ately to reach untainted property of a defendant, for example, if the crimi-
nal and legitimate aspects of the "enterprise" have been commingled over
time, section 1963 permits the district court a certain amount of discretion
in avoiding draconian (and perhaps potentially unconstitutional) applica-
tions of the forfeiture provision. 11 7
Thus, the courts have taken pains to assert that "the forfeiture
authorized by RICO is, like the traditional in rem action, limited
to interests or property rights put to an illegal use under [the
statute]."118 Any attempt to take the nexus out of in personam
forfeiture by use of a substitute asset scheme is a giant step in
the direction of forfeiture of estate and would needlessly raise
111. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Marubeni Amer. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hu-
ber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
113. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).
114. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
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constitutional questions. Accordingly, CDPA does not include
such a provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article outlines the problems involved in criminal forfei-
ture and a proposal to expand criminal forfeiture when it involves
drug trafficking. It would be remiss, however, to exclude a final
cautionary note:
Whether or not an improved asset forfeiture program will make a sizeable
dent in drug trafficking is uncertain. The almost insatiable demand for
drugs and the huge dollar amounts involved may be obstacles too great for
law enforcement alone to overcome. But a successful forfeiture program
would provide an additional dimension in the war on drugs by attacking
the primary motive for such crimes-monetary gain.1 1 9
It is important to reiterate Judge Politz's observation that a for-
feiture that has an in personam application "is to be most charily
assessed."120 Drug trafficking is an area where in personam for-
feitures are warranted, but future expansion of this concept to
other crimes should be made only after intensive scrutiny and
justification.
119. See ASSET FORFErrURE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
120. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962 (5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J.,
dissenting).
